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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Welfare and Its Common Critiques 
 Before we begin a comparison between welfare systems by calculating the net 
social wage, it is vital to first define what a welfare system is. Michael Katz (2010, p. 
510) explains that a welfare system is a collection of institutionalized programs that are 
designed to protect “against the risks inherent in human life—unemployment, poverty, 
sickness and old age – that in one way or another confront everyone.” Donatella Gatti and 
Andrew Glyn (2006) further add that the three main objectives of a welfare system are to: 
protect workers, provide insurance for life events that affect us all and reduce inequality.  
 Today in the United States when policy makers and the mainstream media attack 
the welfare system it is usually in reference to government handouts to the “undeserving 
poor.” However narrowly defining welfare as government handouts to the “undeserving” 
excludes the majority of welfare expenditures that in reality go to programs such as 
education, social security, medical coverage for the elderly and insurance for the 
disabled. Yet it is no accident that these forms of welfare are ignored in the discussion 
today. By ignoring these forms of “deserving” assistance and in turn only focusing on the 
“undeserving,” the attack on the welfare system seems justified (Moudud and Zacharias, 
1999; Katz, 2010). Further this group of “undeserving” recipients has over time become 
concentrated on unmarried women of color so that today the welfare system in the United 
States has “acquired the combined stigmas of race [and] gender” (Katz, 2010, p. 509). 
Although this attack on welfare has certainly intensified in the past thirty years, 
the distinction between “social security” and “welfare” within the United States can be 
traced back to the foundation of the original Social Security Act of 1935. While it is true 
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that some politicians fought for a more inclusive policy, what in the end was enacted in 
the original Social Security Act outlined very minimal and temporary public assistance 
programs, directed only for the sick and elderly. This very clearly separated public 
assistance, what we consider welfare today, from social insurance, and additionally 
excluded health care from the act all together (Moudud and Zacharias, 1999).  
On top of the sociological attacks, mainstream economists also critique the 
welfare system. The most common neoclassical economic criticism has always been 
based on the belief that the welfare system conflicts with the process of capital 
accumulation, which is deemed to be the driver of economic growth. The defenders of 
this view assert that the welfare system introduces labor market distortions, reduces the 
efficiency of the private sector by crowding out private investment and increases budget 
deficits and public debt (Moudud and Zacharias, 1999).  
These conservative critiques of the welfare system rely on three major 
assumptions that are based on economic theory, but are unrealistic in practice. The first 
assumption is that market forces determine wages so that wages rise and fall in line with 
the supply of and the demand for labor. In other words, full employment is possible as 
long as wages are flexible enough to achieve the labor market equilibrium. However, in 
reality wages are determined by institutional and historical factors, making zero or very 
low unemployment practically impossible. Thus, the conservative critique that welfare 
systems introduce labor market distortions is unwarranted. In fact, increased government 
spending on social programs such as unemployment insurance and labor training should 
decrease unemployment by increasing the demand for labor and serve as a protection for 
the unemployed (Moudud & Zacharias, 2000).   
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The second major assumption made by supply-side economists is that household 
savings decisions drive long-run growth. However as Jamee Moudad and Ajit Zacharias 
(1999) point out, household saving rates do not determine interest rates, but are instead 
the result of them. In line with the Keynesian economics view, Moudud and Zacharias 
(2000, p.3) argue that “what is important for capital accumulation is not aggregate 
savings but the investable surplus, which is that portion of private (business and 
household) savings that is available for investment in the business sector after the rest of 
savings in the private sector has been set aside as money and bonds.” 
The final assumption neoclassical economists make to rationalize their attack on 
the welfare system is that welfare systems increase government deficit and public debt. 
The argument follows that the costs of welfare programs outweigh their benefits. To 
justify their position, neoclassical economists commonly cite the vast amount of 
individuals who abuse these programs such as the earlier described depiction of 
unmarried welfare mothers or individuals who receive unemployment benefits without 
looking for a job (Freeman, Swedenborg and Topel, 2005). Although evidence showing 
the relationships between economic growth rates and the size of the welfare system are 
somewhat mixed, as Figure 1 demonstrates we do know that in terms of measured GDP 
per capita, welfare spending and aggregate economic performance are not negatively 
correlated (Atkinson, 1999). 
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Figure 1: Growth Rate of GDP per Capita vs. Public Social Expenditures of GDP 
(average for 1980 to 2012) 
Source: OECD Data Set (see data appendix for details) 
 
Through measuring net social wage, the difference between the social expenditure 
and taxes for the working class, for the United States and for Sweden, this paper will 
dispute these three mainstream assumptions. The net social wage in both Sweden and the 
United States over the past 50 years has been virtually zero1. This proves, in part, that 
despite the differences in the welfare systems in the two countries, as a whole, social 
expenditures on the working population does not cause an economic drain. 
 
1.2 Path Dependency of a Welfare State 
We can now turn to look at how and why the U.S. and Sweden have developed 
such distinct welfare systems. To get an idea of the variance in the size of the welfare 
systems, I refer to the percentage of Gross Domestic Product that both Sweden and the 
United States have spent on social programs over the past 30 years. As one can see from 
figure 2, for the past 30 years Sweden has spent an average of just under 29% of their 
GDP on social spending while the United States has spent an average of 17%. 
1 See figure 12  
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Figure 2: Public Social Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP 
Source: OECD (see data appendix for details) 
 
As seen in Figure 2, social spending in Sweden has been more or less stable at 
about 29% while the U.S. saw a one-time jump in their social spending in 2007 to 2009 
by about 5%. This jump in spending was in response to the recent global financial crisis. 
The increase was not due to expanded social programs, but instead due to an increase in 
the number of people receiving unemployment and other forms of benefits. In addition, 
because of the severity of the crisis, the duration individuals received these benefits also 
increased.  
The U.S.’s choice to not expand its social programs in response to the 2007 
financial crisis can be linked back to the idea of path dependency. The theory of path 
dependency hypothesizes that pre-existing policies and institutions within a country mold 
that country’s future decisions and developments (Katz, 2010). It is important to 
understand that path dependency does not mean that change can never occur.  Instead a 
welfare state that is path dependent is one in which the countries’ past experiences, pre-
existing policies and their historical, political and economic contexts have an influence 
on how their welfare systems are constructed today (Wilsford, 1994). Thus, the United 
State’s response to the financial crisis in terms of social spending shows that while 
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change can occur in response to a major event like an economic downturn, the type and 
scope of the changes are highly dependent on the country’s history.  
Thus, to understand both the American and the Swedish welfare systems today it 
is essential to look at the historical trajectories of the two countries’ welfare systems.  
Only then can we understand how path dependency and seemingly minute decisions 
made over a hundred years ago, still affect Sweden and the United States’ welfare 
systems today. As Gatti and Glyn (2006, p. 311) point out “it is their evolution, not some 
remorseless economic logic, that will determine the future of the welfare state.” 
 
Chapter 2: Historical Context 
2.1 Foundational Period  
United States 
 In the seventeenth century, the colonists brought with them to the United States 
the Elizabethan Poor Laws. Created in England in the late-sixteenth and early-
seventeenth century, these laws established the principle of local responsibility for the 
needy through local churches. This meant that the burden of supervision and monetary 
responsibility fell on the members of the local community. This burden of responsibility 
combined with high taxes to pay for those who needed assistance made newly 
independent Americans dislike these laws from the start. Even though these laws were at 
times suspended, the new states begrudgingly recognized the need for some sort of 
support for the poor and needy, leading to the long-lasting existence of these laws 
(Trattner, 1999). 
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 Although imperfect, the Elizabethan Poor Laws remained virtually unchanged 
until the Civil War. Beginning in 1862, states began to appropriate funds for the care of 
veterans and their families.  Within the year, the national government followed suit. At 
the same time, many organizations such as the Sanitary Commission (1861) and the New 
York State Charities Aid Association (1872) were founded to aid war veterans and their 
families through private funds (Trattner, 1999). Even though welfare awareness and 
support generally increased during the time of the Civil War, federal government support 
was only temporary. Once the Civil War ended, the federal government no longer took 
responsibility for the organization and funding of welfare programs, leaving all 
responsibility to the states and private charities. With the states free to design their own 
welfare laws, different forms of social spending proliferated.  In the South, where racist 
views were prevalent, blacks were often altogether barred from receiving any sort of aid.  
The federal government did not interfere with any of the states’ choices (Trattner, 1999).  
After the Civil War, as the economy boomed and the wounds of the recent war 
began to fade, the idea of Scientific Charity began to grow. Scientific Charity was built 
on the notion of self-reliance and limited government and fit extremely well with the 
recently popular concept of Social Darwinism. Together these two ideas led charities to 
shape social support around “fixing” individuals through discipline and religious 
education.  Although not all Americans believed in these ideas, the general popularity of 
these concepts altered the public opinion of Americans so that unemployment and 
poverty became seen as issues of the individual and not of the system. This new attitude, 
decreased citizens support for any government welfare spending (Trattner, 1999). 
Although private agencies continued to provide relief to the poor, their work tried to 
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“fix” the individual and never addressed the systematic issues of unemployment, poverty, 
or the income gap directly. Additionally, left over from relief practices enacted during the 
Civil War, any form of support that individuals received was always temporary. At the 
end of the 19th century, lacking any form of formalized governmental welfare system, 
private charities grew to dominate welfare spending in the United States. For example, in 
1878 in Philadelphia alone, there were more then 800 private charitable groups (Trattner, 
1999). 
 
Sweden 
Historically Sweden had been an agricultural society, but in the mid-nineteenth 
century the country went through a period of industrialization, transforming the country’s 
economy into an export-oriented manufacturing society. In response to these economic 
changes, the Swedish government intentionally intervened on a national level by 
initiating liberal trade reforms within Europe, altering the education system, and 
assuming the responsibility for the development of country-wide infrastructure (Sjögren, 
2008). The reason this was so successful was because the government worked in 
conjunction with the private industries. 
Experiencing the success of the national government’s role in the country’s 
industrialization, Swedes approved of government intervention in the private sector. This 
attitude helped lead the way for the acceptance of future compromises between various 
parties, classes, and interest groups, on both a local and national level.  This type of 
governmental process, known as consensual governance, was most common in the 
triangular relationships among the government, trade unions and employers’ associations. 
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To help strengthen the power of the unions within this triangular relationship, in 1898 
workers founded the Swedish Confederation of Trade Unions.  The Swedish Employers’ 
Confederation was founded only four years later in 1902 (Sjögren, 2008). In addition to 
their long history, these relationships were made even easier as Sweden has always been 
a relatively small state (with a population of less then 10 million) and has always had 
very little ethnic or religious diversity (Alestalo, Hort, Kuhnle, 2009).  To further 
represent the workers in the political arena, the Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP) 
was founded in 1889. From the early-twentieth century until today, the Social Democratic 
Party has dominated the political system in Sweden.  
With all these changes going on, Sweden was “politically and intellectually 
prepared or ripe for state social action” (Alestalo, Hort, Kuhnle, 2009, p. 12).  At this 
time, Sweden’s neighbor, Germany, had the most developed social insurance program in 
the world. In 1884 the Swedish government appointed a committee to study the programs 
of the German social insurance system. Based on the findings of the committee, Sweden 
initiated its first welfare program in the form of limited sickness insurance in 1892. Over 
the next 60 years, Sweden introduced universal and compulsory social security schemes 
such as industrial accident insurance in 1901, national pensions in 1913, child allowances 
in 1948 and national sickness insurance in 1955 (Alestalo, Hort, Kuhnle, 2009).    
 
2.2 The American Welfare System Plays Catch Up 
In 1929, after years of economic growth, the Great Depression hit the United 
States causing the worst economic downturn in American history and making many 
Americans aware for the first time, of the inadequacy of their country’s welfare system. 
 12 
From 1929 to 1933, unemployment rose from 3.2% to 25%. Over the same time period, 
real Gross National Product declined to 71% of what it had been in 1929 (Himmelberg, 
2001).  During the same time period, excluding farm families, 34 million Americans were 
without any income and malnutrition rose to affect 20% of all Americans (Rothbard, 
1963). With no federal welfare system in place, the repercussions of the Great Depression 
on American people in all corners of the country were immense.  
In the absence of federal insurance programs, support for the unemployed fell to 
private agencies.  However, with only limited funding and an historical focus on fixing 
individual weaknesses, the services of the private agencies were nowhere near adequate 
to feed, clothe or house the millions of Americans who needed assistance. Severely 
strained and lacking any formalized funding, the majority of these private agencies were 
forced to close down (Trattner, 1999). 
Faced with a collapsed economy, rising unemployment, and an increasingly large 
starving and homeless population, America’s newly elected President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt was faced with the daunting task of somehow reversing the country’s 
depressed economy and supporting its struggling population. What made Roosevelt 
different from previous American presidents was his philosophical determination to 
transform the government’s perception of welfare recipients and redefine the market.  
The appropriation of national funds and the organization of social benefits reflected this 
recognition that the unemployed, sick, elderly, or those who could not support themselves 
were not to blame for their situation. And for the first time, with the passage of the Social 
Security Act, the American government recognized that the invisible hand is not a perfect 
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economic regulator and, in certain situations, government intervention and protection is 
necessary (Trattner, 1999). 
Therefore to accomplish this, between 1933 and 1938, President Roosevelt 
enacted the New Deal. Most importantly for the creation of the welfare system was the 
Social Security Act of 1935.2 This act was the first universal national welfare program in 
the United States, but was based on pre-existing state-level social insurance programs, 
such as the Wicks Act, which was an unemployment program enacted in 1931 when 
Roosevelt was the governor of the state of New York (Trattner, 1999). The Social 
Security Act appropriated funds for old-age assistance (by far the largest public 
assistance program), unemployment insurance, public assistance to dependent children in 
single-parent families, public assistance to the crippled and to the blind, and limited 
public health services. 
Although a very important first step for the American welfare system, the Social 
Security Act appropriated national funds to the states to distribute at their own discretion. 
Thus, although the Social Security Act was universal in its language, because the funding 
was at the states’ discretion and they could set criteria for who could receive benefits, the 
act was not necessarily universal in its application (Social Security Act of 1935). For 
2 Of course there are many other important programs in addition to the Social Security 
Act that made up the New Deal including the Civilian Conservation Corps (which 
provided work relief for young men), the Federal Emergency Relief Administration 
(which provided states with funding for unemployment relief), the Civil Works 
Administration (which created direct federal relief work for the unemployed), the Works 
Progress Administration (which provided mostly blue-collar jobs for the unemployed to 
carry out public work projects), The Wagner Act (which guaranteed rights of workers to 
organize in unions and engage in collective bargaining). Over the period of the New 
Deal, the economy recovered drastically. In 1939 after all of the New Deal policies were 
enacted, GNP surpassed 1929 levels by 7% and unemployment fell to 17% (Himmelberg, 
2001).  
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example, in segregated states, minorities, especially blacks, did not receive adequate 
support.  Additionally, by being universal, benefits were not means tested. This meant 
that cash benefits were not based on need, but were instead based on the past earnings of 
the individual or family (Katz, 2010). 
In addition to the benefits outlined in the Social Security Act of 1935, the act also 
laid out new taxes for the American people. These taxes took two forms: an income tax 
on the employee and an excise tax on the employer.   In practice, however, the employee 
felt the greatest impact. In response to the costs of the excise tax, employers could 
increase their prices, but employees did not have the option of increasing their wages to 
cover the cost of the income tax. As a result, employees faced both the costs of their own 
income tax plus the cost of the employer’s excise tax in the form of increased prices 
(Social Security Act of 1935). Since the impact of these taxes fell disproportionately on 
the employees, the income gap grew.  
Although Roosevelt’s initial goal was to protect his population and reverse the 
recent economic downturn through the development of a federal welfare system, he was 
forced to compromise within his own government. As a result, the outcome was quite 
different from the newly developing European systems. In contrast to the Swedish system 
for example, the U.S. welfare programs developed inequalities inherent in the 
organization of the system. 
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2.3 The Golden Age and The Great Society Years 
Sweden 
Although the Great Depression was felt most dramatically in the United States, its 
effects spread worldwide.   In response to this economic crisis, the Swedish government, 
which historically leaned towards Keynesian policy measures, moved to adopt state 
intervention as an integral part of its economic policy. Although the Swedish Social 
Democratic Party had been established at the end of the 19th century, the party’s 
philosophy of a mixed economy truly gained dominance during the period of the 1930s to 
1970s (Sjögren, 2008).   
Thus, Keynesian economic ideas, which relied on interventionist social measures 
for economic stability and growth, went hand in hand with the Social Democrat’s “stable 
party government operating with a bias towards consensus” (Sjögren, 2008, p. 45). As a 
result, the Social Democrats were able to form “The Middle Way” where the government 
sets macroeconomic goals and regulates the market. The core goals of this model are: full 
employment (unemployment levels of 1.5-2.5%), low inflation (under 3%), high degrees 
of cyclical stability, zero or positive balance of payments, growth of the public economic 
sector, no visible structural imbalances between economic sectors, annual growth rates at 
about 4% and a solidarity-based wage policy3 (Sjögren, 2008). As a result of this “Middle 
Way” from 1930 to 1950, Sweden experienced the highest economic growth rate among 
industrialized countries. Because of these high levels of growth this period became 
3 The solidarity-based wage policy does three unique things for the Swedish economy. 
First, it aims to eliminate the gender wage gap by introducing equal pay for equal work. 
Secondly, it closes the gap between high and low wage earners by increasing wages for 
low wage earners. Lastly, it allows workers to benefit from productivity growth by tying 
wage increases to increases in productivity so that wage growth is 0.5% less of the 
economy wide average productivity growth. 
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known as the Golden Age (see Table 1).  This period was marked with an incredible 
increase in the standard of living for the working class, a decrease in the difference of 
income between classes and allowed the government to enact egalitarian policies such as 
almost full income compensation for social services such as unemployment, sickness and 
child care (Sjöberg, n.d.) 
Table 1: Annual Growth in GDP per Capita (%) 
Years Sweden United States 
1500-1820 0.17 0.36 
1820-1870 0.66 1.34 
1870-1913 1.46 1.82 
1913-1950 2.12 1.61 
1950-1973 3.07 2.45 
1973-1998 1.31 1.99 
Source: Madisson, 2007, table B-19, p. 262 
 
In addition to the country’s high levels of growth during the Golden Age, 
Sweden’s public sector workforce also expanded dramatically, growing from 4.7% of 
total employment in 1937 to 30.3% in 1980 (see Table 2).  Because of the increasing 
growth rate and in turn the decreasing unemployment rate, the growth of the public sector 
came from those who were previously voluntarily unemployed, most notably, women 
who had previously worked in the household. This meant that now these women were 
economically valued so that they were now receiving salaries and more importantly, 
being taxed (Steinmo, 2002). It is important to note that these women were able to leave 
the home because of Sweden’s extensive benefits including guaranteed childcare and 
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education, paid maternity leave and vacation. Expanding the public sector to increase the 
country’s working population was just one of the many ways Sweden used these years of 
economic success and stability to ensure egalitarian policies that would benefit the entire 
population for years to come.  
Table 2: Government Employment: Sweden, 1870-1994 (% of total employment) 
Years Government Employment 
~1870 2.2% 
1913 3.5% 
1937 4.7% 
1960 12.8% 
1980 30.3% 
1994 32.0% 
Source: Steinmo, 2002, p. 20 
 
The United States 
From the 1930s through the early 1970s, the United States also experienced a 
period of economic growth even though it was not as impressive as the growth rate in 
Sweden (see Table 1). In the 1960s, President Lyndon Johnson introduced the social 
reforms under the Great Society programs, headlined by the fight for civil rights and a 
public war on poverty.  With Democrats in the majority, the government passed the 
Economic Opportunity Act and initiated the Peace Corps and Head Start programs.4 But 
4 The Economic Opportunity Act provided funding for Community Action Agencies, 
which set up programs for low-income individuals including student work-study and 
adult education classes. The Peace Corps is a program that sends U.S. citizens abroad to 
initiate poverty reducing programs including setting up schools and hospitals. Head Start 
provides government subsidized pre-school programs for low-income children. 
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the real impact, both positive and negative, on welfare programs came with two 
amendments to the Social Security Act.  Stepping in for the first time to guarantee 
medical care for some Americans, Congress passed The Social Security Amendments of 
1965 creating Medicare to provide health insurance for the elderly and Medicaid to 
support health insurance for poor families.  However moving in the opposite direction, 
the Social Security Amendments of 1965 also removed Aid to Dependent Children from 
the Social Security Act and created instead Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC). AFDC is what most people in the United States refer to today simply as 
“welfare.” Separating family aid from social security was a major change that cemented 
the distinction between social security and public assistance (what most people call 
welfare). As discussed later in the paper, this distinction would allow the government to 
change family aid regulations and appropriations without impacting social security (Katz, 
2010).  
President Johnson used this period of economic growth to expand the welfare 
system by his war on poverty and inequality. However, without cooperation in the 
government like that seen in Sweden, enacting these policies came at a price. Going 
against Johnson, conservative policy makers used this period of economic stability and 
growth to retract earlier welfare policies believing that they were no longer necessary and 
only a source for abuse. Most notably was the creation and immediate separation of 
AFDC from Social Security, which in turn with reduced taxes and expenditures, left the 
U.S. safety net non-existent and made the welfare system extremely vulnerable to the 
future. 
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2.4 International Attack on the Welfare State 
Although welfare systems in both the United States and Sweden expanded the 
scope of benefits to their citizens and addressed social issues such as poverty and 
unemployment, for the past 40 years welfare in both countries has been under attack. 
Reviewing history, this attack on the welfare system is likely a result of multiple factors 
including two worldwide recessions caused by oil price hikes in the 1970s, globalization, 
increasing popularity of neo-liberalism and Reaganomics and the declining power of the 
working class.  
 The worldwide recessions caused by oil price hikes led to a decrease in economic 
output throughout the world. Sweden and the United States were no exception. However 
with the newly popular conservative economic ideals, both countries ignored the oil crisis 
and instead blamed their economic downturns on their welfare systems. In turn 
politicians in both Sweden and the U.S. reduced social benefits over the next twenty-year 
period, believing that this would return their economic output to the previously high 
levels. 
 
United States 
 Ronald Reagan, president from 1981 to 1989, believed in supply-side economics. 
Reaganomics featured a combination of reduced government spending on social 
programs, increased military spending, termination of government regulations and tax 
cuts, especially for the wealthy. Reagan believed strongly in self-sufficiency and 
encouraged this norm throughout his policies.  Over this period, President Reagan 
claimed that lowering taxes and cutting social spending would not only help spur 
 20 
economic growth, but would also decrease unemployment and poverty. Under this neo-
liberal approach, Reagan believed that self-sufficiency and the power of the invisible 
economic hand would fix the problems that he believed social spending was exacerbating 
(Trattner, 1999).  However, as seen in figure 3, over the period of Reagan’s presidential 
terms, the poverty rate in fact increased. 
 
Figure 3: Percent of Americans Living Below the Poverty Line (after taxes) 
Source: OECD (see data appendix for details) 
 
Key to Reagan’s welfare policies was removing welfare from the responsibility of 
the national government and returning the responsibility to the states, a position that 
reversed the New Deal’s intention to nationalize social safety nets.  Reaganomics also 
erased the New Deal’s message that economic assistance was a citizen’s right and 
returned to the philosophy that economic need was a problem that lay with the individual 
who could not find work or feed his family (Trattner, 1999).  Although Reagan started 
the attack on the welfare system, the attack did not end when he left office.   
In 1996 the Personal Responsibility and Work Reconciliation Act was passed 
with bipartisan support in both the House and the Senate and signed into law by President 
Bill Clinton, who was significantly, a Democrat.  This legislation changed welfare in the 
United States in two ways.  First, it required those on public assistance to have or be 
1515.516
16.51717.5
1818.519
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actively looking for a job.  Secondly, it replaced AFDC with a program called Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) which further limited the scope of welfare 
provisions by setting a lifetime limit for benefits of five years and making legal 
immigrants who had lived in the U.S. for less than five years ineligible for any benefits.  
This legislation reflected the growing public hostility towards public assistance and a loss 
of the belief that a social safety net was a citizen’s right (Katz, 2010). In addition, while 
only thirty years earlier, Democrats such as Roosevelt and Johnson fought for the 
expansion the welfare system, now the attack on the welfare system was bipartisan. This 
demonstrated that the conservative mentality highlighting the negativity of welfare was 
so engrained in the American mindset that even the Democratic “middle way” was a 
retrenchment of the already limited system. 
Over the next ten years, as the number of welfare recipients in the United States 
decreased by 50%, supply siders credited the success of the Clinton legislation in moving 
people from welfare to work.  Based on these results, President George Bush signed into 
law in 2005 the Deficit Reduction Act, which imposed even tougher requirements to 
receive public assistance. However, no evidence supports a direct correlation between 
these stricter welfare requirements and a decline in the welfare rolls. In fact, data shows 
that the decline was more likely the result of job growth in a strong economy and 
individuals who were discouraged from even applying for welfare because of the strict 
requirements.  As Katz (2010 p. 512) explains “some researchers estimated that at most 
10 percent to 20 percent of former welfare recipients earned enough to leave poverty 
permanently.”  
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Sweden 
 Sweden was also forced to respond to the impact of global economic forces.  
During the 1970s and 1980s the world economy was undergoing major changes so that 
Sweden’s export manufacturing industries (mining, steel, shipbuilding and automobile) 
were all hit by growing competition from developing Asian countries. Because of the 
economy’s dependence on its manufacturing sector and increased competition from 
abroad, the country’s economy faced structural problems.  To better diversify its 
economy and deal with the pressure of the period’s decline in economic growth, the 
Swedish government borrowed excessively. However instead of helping the situation the 
interest rates of these loans only furthered the country’s budget deficit (Sjögren, 2008). In 
addition to hurting the Swedish economy this economic downturn also hurt the Swedish 
population. With increased competition from abroad, unemployment in the country 
increased, which led to increasing demands for government support. To meet these 
demands, Sweden increased their taxes so that by 1990 taxes were more then 60% of the 
country’s GDP (Steinmo, 2002). 
With the economic situation not improving, the Swedish government attempted a 
new approach to cure the economic situation. Following the popular supply side 
economics in 1991 the Swedish government passed the Tax Reform of the Century, 
which substantially reduced both income and corporate tax rates for all taxpayers. 
However instead of helping the situation, this too only made it worse. When an economic 
crisis caused by the collapse of the property market hit the country in 1993 to 1994, the 
tax reform exacerbated the crisis. With the lower taxes, the government did not have the 
resources to pay for the increase demand for government benefits. As a result, the crisis 
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was more of a drain on the economy then it would have ever been with the higher tax 
levels. Consequently the country’s deficit grew to 13% of its GDP (Steinmo, 2002). 
Based on the government decisions over the past thirty years many claim today 
that Swedish policy makers have been deviating from the ideal of equality that used to be 
held so highly. Interestingly though, although the policy makers may be diverging from 
the Swedish ideal, “survey after survey has shown that while Swedes (like virtually all 
citizens in modern welfare states) agree that taxes are too high, only a minority of citizens 
support tax cuts if they are forced to chose them in exchange for reductions in public 
spending”  (Steinmo, 2002, p. 15). 
Starting with the “Middle Way”, the international attack on the welfare system 
based on neoliberal economics has caused Swedish policy makers to deviate from these 
egalitarian policies. However, high taxes (as compared to the U.S. and other 
industrialized countries) and a general mindset of the importance of equality, common in 
the Swedish population demonstrate that the welfare system is still stronger in Sweden 
than many other advanced industrialized countries. In comparison, the United States 
never focused on the importance of equality, but instead highlighted the importance of 
hard work and independence. This led the U.S. to only attempt to nationalize welfare 
when it was forced to such as in response to the Civil War and the Great Depression. Yet 
compared to other industrialized countries these attempts at a nationalized welfare system 
were just drops in the bucket. This half-hearted creation of the welfare state has left the 
system inadequate and unable to form as a safety net and has instigated a very negative 
connotation of the system among most American people and policy makers. 
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Chapter 3: Net Social Wage 
3.1 Literature Review 
 After understanding the historical context of the welfare system in the United 
States and Sweden, we now turn to develop a measurement to accurately compare the 
two country’s clearly distinct welfare systems. The mainstream economics methodology 
on the social impact of state taxation and spending is limited in its presence and flawed in 
its application. The first reason this methodology is flawed is because it groups 
individuals by income and not by social class. This combines people who derive their 
income from labor with people who derive their income from property ownership, which 
is problematic as it obscures the distinction between workers and capitalists. The second 
problem with the mainstream methodology is that it treats all government spending as 
having equal benefits for the working class. This is an issue as not all government 
spending benefits all Americans equally. For example military spending, which directly 
or indirectly benefits many of these capitalists does not positively benefit the working 
class in the same way that other forms of spending such as spending on education or 
health care does (Szamuely, 1990; Brady, 2005). 
 In response to this limited conservative methodology, political economists 
developed new ways to measure the growth of the welfare state and its impact on the 
working class. Unlike mainstream economists, political economists split individuals into 
groups by social class, thus separating workers from property owners. In addition, they 
focus only on the government spending that benefits workers directly, therefore 
excluding expenditures such as military spending (Bowles & Gintis, 1982; Fazeli & 
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Fazeli, 2012; Maniatis, 2013; 1993; Miller, 1989; Shaikh, 2003; Shaikh & Tonak, 2000; 
1987; Therborn, 1984). 
 There are two distinct methodologies of the new measurement of the social 
impact of a welfare state. The first methodology looks at the benefits worker’s receive, 
but ignores the taxes that they pay. These measurements are known as the “citizen wage” 
or “social wage” (Therborn, 1984). Although this methodology moves in the right 
direction as it separates workers from property owners and only counts social spending 
that directly benefits workers, it overestimates the benefit worker’s receive from the state 
because it does not account for the taxes that they pay.  
The second methodology provides a more complete picture by accounting for 
both social expenditures on workers and taxes paid by workers. This more inclusive 
method provides us with the difference between spending on workers and taxes paid by 
workers and so is called the “net social wage.” Anwar Shaikh and Ahmet Tonak (2000; 
1987) are the pioneers of the net social wage methodology. In a series of studies they 
found the net social wage to be negative in the United States for most of the postwar 
period, excluding a few years of economic crisis when the net social wage became 
positive. This means that according to their calculations the workers paid more in taxes 
than they received from the state in benefits (Shaikh, 2003; Shaikh & Tonak, 2000; 
1987). 
In an earlier study, Sam Bowles and Herbert Gintis (1982) employ a variant of the 
net social wage measurement to examine who pays for the welfare system in United 
States in the postwar period. However contrary to Shaikh and Tonak’s findings, Bowles 
and Gintis found a high and growing net social wage over the postwar period. This meant 
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that workers received more in benefits than they paid in taxes. Although these findings 
seem to contradict one another, work by John Miller (1989) and Thanasis Maniatis 
(2013) show that Bowles and Gintis’s methodology has errors that explain their inverse 
results.  
First, as Miller (1989) explains Bowles and Gintis underestimate the number of 
working individuals within each U.S. household, assuming each household has one 
worker with three dependents. However, in reality in 1977, when this study was 
conducted, the average household had 1.2 workers per household. This miscalculation 
underestimates the taxes paid and overestimates the social welfare received. In addition, 
as Maniatis (1993) points out, Bowles and Gintis exclude all state and local taxes in their 
study, only accounting for federal taxes. This further underestimates the amount of taxes 
workers pay. 
Once these errors are accounted for, the agreement among the net social wage 
literature is that in the postwar period from 1952 to 2000, the net social wage in the 
United States has been negative. That is, the workers have been paying more in taxes 
than they have been receiving in benefits (Maniatis, 2013; 1993; Miller, 1989; Shaikh, 
2003; Shaikh & Tonak, 2000; 1987).  
While most of these studies have focused on the U.S., studies that have looked at 
the net social wage in other countries further debunk the conservative critique that 
welfare systems are a burden on the economy. This is supported by findings of negative 
or positive and small net social wages in multiple welfare states. Most pertinent for our 
study is a dissertation by Maniatis (1993) that found an average zero net social wage for 
Sweden from 1963 to 1985. In addition, other studies have found positive but low net 
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social wages in Australia, Canada, Germany and Sweden (1952 to 1987) (Fazeli & 
Fazeli, 2012; Shaikh, 2003) and a negative net social wage in the U.K and New Zealand 
over the same time period (Maniatis, 2013).  
 
3.2 Methodology 
In this thesis, I apply the net social wage methodology developed by Shaikh and 
Tonak to the United States and Sweden from 1962 to 20125. Conducting an up to date net 
social wage for both the U.S. and Sweden is important since the last year the majority of 
these studies were conducted was 1987 (Maniatis, 1993; 2013; Shaikh, 2003) with the 
most up to date study going only to 2006 (Fazeli & Fazeli, 2012). In the U.S. this 
expansion is especially important because of the recent financial crisis felt in the country, 
which could have severely affected the welfare system.  
In addition, I will be adding indirect business taxes to the net social wage 
measurement. An indirect tax is any tax on a good or service that is collected by an 
intermediary, such as a retail store, from the individual who bears the burden of the tax, 
which is most typically the consumer. Although Shaikh and Tonak (1987; 2000) claim 
that indirect taxes should be excluded from the net social wage calculation because they 
do not flow directly from labor, most other economists calculating the net social wage 
include indirect taxes (Akram-Lodhi, 1996; Maniatis, 2013; Sephri & Chernomas, 1992). 
They justify the inclusion of indirect taxes based on the definition of the tax itself. Under 
the definition, because the consumer bears the burden of the tax, even though the tax is 
not imposed on labor income directly, it is never the less felt by the consumer.  
5 Calculations for Sweden begin in 1965 because that is the first year of published tax 
information for Sweden. 
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As figure 4 and figure 5 demonstrate the difference between the amount of taxes 
paid by workers when indirect taxes are and are not included is somewhat substantial. 
However as can be seen in figure 4 and figure 5, the trend of taxes paid by workers in 
both countries is similar in both situations except for an upward shift. Overall, I include 
indirect taxes because by definition they are felt by the consumer and so are included in 
other important studies of net social wage (Akram-Lodhi, 1996; Sephri & Chernomas, 
1992). Additionally, since they do not dramatically alter the tax trend, other than a slight 
shift upwards, their inclusion is justified. So for the remainder of the thesis whenever 
taxes are discussed indirect taxes should be assumed to be included.  
 
Figure 4: Taxes in the United States (billions of U.S. dollars) 
Source: BEA, NIPA (see data appendix for details) 
 
 
Figure 5: Taxes in Sweden (billions of Swedish kronor) 
Source: OECD (see data appendix for details) 
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To calculate the net social wage, I collected for the United States from the U.S. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) website and for Sweden from Statistics Sweden historical 
yearbooks and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
website. To find how the net social wage has changed in the two countries over time, I 
calculated the net social wage for a 50-year period from 1962 to 20126.  
Further, the primary focus of this study is “the extent to which the state’s 
involvement in taxation and expenditures serve to redistribute a portion of the nation’s 
surplus product to, or from, the working class” (Shaikh & Tonak, 2000 p. 248). To do 
this, we define the category of the working clsdd as members of the population who do 
not have ownership of capital as their primary source of income. Focusing specifically on 
the working population is important because, the neo-liberal assumption holds that a 
welfare state is a drain on the economy and is funded by redistribution from the state and 
the capitalist class (Moudud & Zacharias, 1999). However, the direction of the net social 
wage will demonstrate that the government and capitalist class are not subsidizing 
worker’s benefits and in turn that this mainstream critique against welfare states is 
unwarranted. 
I start by calculating the government expenditures on labor. I split state 
expenditures into two categories to account for the expenditures directed solely towards 
workers and those directed towards both workers and non-workers alike:  
6 Again, Sweden data begins in 1965. See footnote 5 for an explanation as to why. 
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1. Worker Benefits (E1) includes income support, social security and welfare, 
housing and community services, labor training and services. These benefits 
are assumed to be received entirely by the workers.  
2. Conventional Benefits (E2) includes education, health and hospitals, 
recreational and cultural activities, energy, natural resources, postal service 
and transportation. These benefits are assumed to be received by both the 
workers and non-workers, so the amount of benefits going to workers is 
calculated by multiplying the group total by the labor share (LS) in personal 
income.7 
To calculate expenditures totally allocated to labor I will then add E1 to E2 times labor 
share or E1+E2*LS. 
I then calculate the contribution of the workers to taxes. For the tax side of the 
equation I will split the tax revenues into three categories:  
1. Social Security Taxes (T1) includes contributions for social insurance 
plus payroll taxes. These taxes are only applied to workers. 
2. Personal Taxes (T2) includes personal income (both federal and state), 
motor vehicle and licenses, property, and other taxes. These taxes fall on 
both workers and non-workers, so the amount of taxes paid to workers is 
calculated by multiplying total personal taxes by the labor share (LS). 
7 I’m multiplying by labor share (LS) because there is no division of benefits between 
workers and non-workers. Thus, I’m estimating the workers’ share of expenditures by 
multiplying all expenditures times the country’s labor share. As I explain below, there is 
also no measurement of the workers’ share of taxes paid so to find the share of taxes paid 
by workers I will also multiply total taxes by labor share. 
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1. Indirect Taxes (T3) includes value-added and sales taxes. These taxes fall on 
both workers and non-workers and so the amount paid by workers is 
calculated by multiplying total indirect taxes by the labor share (LS). 
To calculate taxes totally allocated to labor, I then add T1 to T2 times labor share plus T3 
times labor share or T1+(T2*LS)+(T3*LS). 
After having collected all of the data on worker’s expenditures and taxes as 
explained above I calculate the net social wage by subtracting total taxes on labor from 
total expenditures on labor. In other words, net social wage can be found as follows: 
NSW=(E1+(E2*LS))-(T1+(T2*LS)+(T3*LS)) 
Where NSW is net social wage and other variables are described before. 
Table 3 and table 4 below show the detailed calculations of the net social wage 
for the year 2000 for both the United States and Sweden8. 
Table 3: Net Social Wage for the United States, year 2000 (billions of U.S. dollars) 
 Expenditure Group I: Entirely Allocated to Labor (E1) 1091.90 
NIPA table 3.12 lines 4-40 (minus 
lines 14, 16-20 and 26)+NIPA table 
3.15.5, line 35 
Social Security, welfare and income support 1057.80 
NIPA table 3.15.5, line 26 Housing and community services 33.10 
NIPA table 3.12, line 41 Employment and training 1.00 
    
 Expenditure Group II: Partially Allocated to Labor (E2*LS) 576.01 
NIPA table 2.1, line 1/2      Labor Share 0.68 
 Expenditure Group II Total (E2) 849.06 
NIPA table 3.15.5, line 29 Education 536.00 
NIPA table 3.15.5, line 27 Health 109.70 
NIPA table 3.15.5, line 28 Recreation and culture 28.10 
NIPA table 3.15.5, line 22 Energy 22.10 
NIPA table 3.15.5, line 23 Natural Resources 29.10 
NIPA table 3.15.5, line 24 Postal Services 4.50 
 Passenger Transportation = transporation x GCONS 119.56 
NIPA table 3.15.5, line 13      Transportation 170.80 
Shaikh & Tonak, 2000      Transportation (*gas consumption of laborers) 0.70 
    
 E1+E2*LS = Total benefits and income received by labor 1667.91 
8 Data for the year 2000 is shown here because this is the most recent pre-crash year. 
However, data for all years for both the U.S. and Sweden can be found in the appendix. 
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Source Taxes 2000 
 Tax Group I: Paid Entirely by Labor (T1) 669.80 
NIPA table 3.6 lines 2-31 (minus 
lines 14, 16, 26 and 30) 
Contributions for social insurance 669.80 
   
 Tax Group II: Partially Allocated to Labor (T2*LS) 836.01 
NIPA table 2.1, line 1/2      Labor Share  0.68 
 Tax Group II Total (T2) 1232.30 
 Total income taxes = federal + state and local income taxes 1213.00 
NIPA table 3.4, line 2      Federal income taxes 995.60 
NIPA table 3.4, line 9      States & local income taxes 217.40 
NIPA table 3.4, line 12 Other Taxes 3.10 
NIPA table 3.4, line 10 Motor Vehicle and licenses 11.40 
NIPA table 3.4, line 11 Personal Property Taxes 4.80 
   
 Tax Group III: Partially Allocated to Labor (T3*LS) 480.72 
NIPA table 2.1, line 1/2      Labor Share 0.68 
 Tax Group III Total (T3) 708.60 
NIPA Table 1.10, line 7 Indirect Taxes 708.60 
   
 T1+T2*LS+T3*LS = Total taxes paid by labor  1986.53 
   
 Net Social Wage = Total benefits and income received by labor - 
Total taxes paid by labor (E1+E2*LS) - (T1+T2*LS+T3*LS) 
-318.62 
Source: See data appendix for details 
Table 4: Net Social Wage for Sweden, year 2000 (billions of Swedish kronor) 
 Expenditure Group I: Entirely Allocated to Labor 
(E1) 
315.85 
SCB, State expentidute (current budget) by purpose 
table, "sociålvard och 
socialförsäkring"/"socialförsäkring och social 
välfärd"/"social trygghet" 
Social Security, welfare and income support 239.80 
SCB, State expentidute (current budget) by purpose 
table, "bostadspolitik och 
samhällsplanering"/"bostadspolitik 
samhällsplanering och lokaliseringpolitik" 
Housing and community services 7.54 
SCB, State expentidute (current budget) by purpose 
table, "andra samhälleliga och sociala tjänster"+" 
"ekonomiska tjänster"/"näringslivsfrågor" 
Other economic services 68.51 
    
 Expenditure Group II: Partially Allocated to Labor 
(E2*LS) 
47.96 
OECD, Labor Share      Labor Share 0.67 
 Expenditure Group II Total (E2) 71.199 
SCB, State expentidute (current budget) by purpose 
table, "undervisning"/"utbildning"  
Education 44.83 
SCB, State expentidute (current budget) by purpose 
table, "hälsovård"/"hälso och sjukvård" 
Health 18.79 
SCB, State expentidute (current budget) by purpose 
table, "kultur rekreation" 
Recreation and culture 5.41 
SCB, State expentidute (current budget) by purpose 
table, "energi" 
Energy --- 
SCB, State expentidute (current budget) by purpose 
table, "Miljöskydd" 
Environment 2.17 
SCB, Post office: revenue and expenditure table, 
expenditure 
Postal Services --- 
SCB, State railways: revenue, expenditure and 
financial results 
Railways --- 
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 E1+E2*LS = Total benefits and income received 
by labor 
363.81 
Source Taxes 2000 
 Tax Group I: Paid Entirely by Labor (T1) 357.24 
OECD, Tax Statistics Sweden, 2000 Social security 
contributions  
Contributions for social insurance 307.10 
OECD, Tax Statistics Sweden, 3000 Taxes on 
payroll and workforce 
Payroll Taxes 50.15 
   
 Tax Group II: Partially Allocated to Labor (T2*LS) 281.28 
OECD, Labor Share      Labor Share 0.67 
 Tax Group II Total (T2) 417.59 
 Total income taxes = federal + state and local 
income taxes 
368.79 
OECD, Tax Statistics Sweden, 1110 National 
income tax individual 
     Federal income taxes 32.49 
OECD, Tax Statistics Sweden,1110 Local income 
tax individual 
     States & local income taxes 336.30 
OECD, Tax Statistics Sweden, 5113 Other Other Taxes 1.48 
OECD, Tax Statistics Sweden, 5211 Paid by 
households: motor vehicles  
Motor Vehicle and licenses 7.43 
OECD, Tax Statistics Sweden, 4000 Taxes on 
property  
Personal Property Taxes 39.89 
   
 Tax Group III Labor Total: Partially Allocated to 
Labor (T3*LS) 
188.23 
OECD, Labor Share      Labor Share 0.67 
 Tax Group III Total (T3) 279.45 
OECD, Tax Statistics Sweden, 5100 Taxes on 
production, sale, transfer, etc. 
Indirect Taxes 279.45 
   
 T1+T2*LS+T3*LS = Total taxes paid by labor  826.76 
   
 Net Social Wage = Total benefits and income 
received by labor - Total taxes paid by labor 
(E1+E2*LS) - (T1+T2*LS+T3*LS) 
-462.95 
Source: See data appendix for details9 
 
Chapter 4: Results 
4.1 The Case of an Increasing Net Social Wage: The United States 
In United States the results show a negative net social wage from 1962 to 2001 
(See Figure 6). These results are in line with empirical studies that have found the net 
social wage in the United States from the 1950s to 2000 to be negative (Bowles & Gintis, 
1982; Miller, 1989; Shaikh, 2003; Shaikh & Tonak, 2000; 1987). However, this updated 
9 All NIPA, BEA taxes were compared to OECD taxes for the United States. Because tax 
rates were extremely similar, only NIPA, BEA data was used and and is shown here. 
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data shows a fundamental change since 2002, when many of these studies ended. In fact 
from 2002 to 2012, the net social wage for the U.S. has been positive and in fact quite 
large (see figure 6). This occurred because although both the taxes and benefits rose over 
this time period, the former rose quicker than the latter (see figure 7).  
Figure 7 also helps to explain the spike in net social wage after 2001. In response 
to the international financial crisis beginning in 2001, the number of individuals who 
required government assistance and the amount of benefits each individual needed 
increased. In addition, Bush tax cuts in 2001 and 2003 led to a decrease in taxes or the 
same time period. The combination of an increase in social expenditures due to the 
recession and a decrease in taxes due to the Bush tax cuts, led to this dramatic spike in 
net social wage.  
Another way of looking at net social wage is by comparing it to its share of GDP. 
As seen in figure 8, up until 2001, the net social wage was a negative share of GDP. 
However after the recession of 2001, the cost of redistribution seemed to contribute to the 
toll on the economy because of the positive net social wage. What is important to point 
out however is that the recession occurred before the net social wage became positive. 
Thus a positive net social wage was a consequence of the economic downturn and not, as 
many mainstream economists claim, the cause of it (Fazeli & Fazeli, 2012). 
The recent positive and growing net social wage validates the incapability of a 
welfare system that is based on the ideals of independence and self-sufficiency. By using 
economic success as a pretense to cut both benefits and taxes, the United States is almost 
always left with a non-existent safety net. At the same time, the country’s goal of self-
sufficiency causes policy makers to repeatedly call for limited expenditures on social 
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services. However backfires as the limited scope of benefits causes individuals to become 
stuck in a cycle of poverty and in turn become more reliant on the welfare system. 
Contradictory then to the neoclassical claim that a large welfare system is a drag on the 
economy, the lack of a safety net and the high number of dependent beneficiaries causes 
the limited welfare system in the United States to actually be much more detrimental to 
the economy, especially in the time of crisis, than a large welfare system is. 
 
Figure 6: Net Social Wage in the United States (billions of U.S. dollars) 
Source: BEA, NIPA (see data appendix for details) 
 
 
Figure 7: Benefits and Taxes in the United States (billions of U.S. dollars) 
Source: BEA, NIPA (see data appendix for details) 
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Figure 8: Net Social Wage as a Percentage of GDP in the United States  
Source: BEA, NIPA (see data appendix for details) 
 
 
4.2 The Case of a Decreasing Net Social Wage: Sweden 
 In Sweden, instead of an increasing net social wage like we see in the United 
States, the net social wage has actually been decreasing over the same time period (see 
figure 9). In the immediate postwar period, both the United States and Sweden 
experienced negative net social wages because both countries’ taxes increased faster than 
their expenditures. However, unlike in the U.S., in recent years, Sweden’s net social 
wage has actually been decreasing further. This is because in recent years, even during 
times of economic success Sweden kept their tax levels high, leading to a further 
divergence between taxes and expenditures (see figure 10). 
As with the United States, comparing Sweden’s net social wage to its share of 
GDP provides us with a strong comparison of the welfare system in relation to the 
country’s economy. As seen in figure 11, the net social wage has been a negative 
percentage of GDP in Sweden over the entire time period since 1965. This demonstrates, 
that instead of being a drag on the economy, workers have in fact been contributing to it. 
Although net social wage as a percentage of GDP was negative over this entire time 
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period, beginning in the 1980s, the net social wage as a percentage of GDP decreased 
even further. This occurred because due to the international attack on the welfare state 
Sweden begun to reverse their redistributive policies in order to appease the world 
community. However, unable to fully let go of their egalitarian ideals, the tax levels 
remained high. Thus, the decreasing expenditures combined with high tax rates led to a 
negative and decreasing net social wage, which has continued to be a negative percentage 
of GDP. 
Thus, contrary to conservative critiques, Sweden’s negative and further 
decreasing net social wage demonstrates the strength of a large welfare system. By using 
periods of economic growth and stability to increase taxes, the Swedish system has 
guaranteed a cushion of protection. In addition, the country’s large scope and equal 
access to welfare allows all Swedish citizens equal opportunities to provide for 
themselves and escape a cycle of poverty. Thus, the country’s history of egalitarian 
policies bolstered by the egalitarian beliefs held by the country’s population has 
constructed a welfare system that is protective of all of its citizens, especially in the time 
of crisis.   
 
Figure 9: Net Social Wage in Sweden (Billions of Swedish Kronor) 
Source: Statistics Sweden and OECD (see data appendix for details) 
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Figure 10: Expenditures and Taxes in Sweden (billions of Swedish kronor) 
Source: Statistics Sweden and OECD (see data appendix for details) 
 
 
Figure 11: Net Social Wage as a Percentage of GDP in Sweden 
Source: Statistics Sweden and OECD 
 
4.3 Comparison of Expenditures and Taxes 
 By comparing the net social wage as a percentage of GDP in Sweden and the U.S. 
we can see that the net social wage in the two country’s have been diverging over time 
(see figure 12). To understand whether this divergence in the net social wage is due to a 
difference in the specific type of taxes or expenditures I compared each country’s 
expenditures and taxes for the year 2000. 
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Figure 12: Net Social Wage as a Percentage of GDP in U.S. and Sweden 
Source: See data appendix for details   
 
Figure 13: Share in Total 
Expenditures in the United States 
Source: BEA, NIPA (see data appendix for details) 
 
Figure 14: Share in Total 
Expenditures in Sweden Source: Statistics Sweden (see data appendix for details) 
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Social Security, welfare and income support 63% 
Housing and community services 2% 
Employment and training 0% 
Education 22% 
Health 5% 
Recreation and culture 1% 
Energy 1% 
Natural Resources 1% Postal Services 0% Passenger Transportation 5% 
Social Security, welfare and income support 66% 
Housing and community services 2% 
Other economic services 19% 
Education 8% 
Health 4% 
Recreation and culture 1% Environment 0% 
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 Figure 15: Share in Total Taxes in the 
United States 
Source: BEA, NIPA (see data appendix for details) 
 
Figure 16: Share in Total Taxes in 
Sweden 
Source: OECD, (see data appendix for details) 
As figure 12 and figure 13 show the expenditures distribution between the two 
countries are quite similar. Both countries spend the majority of expenditures (between 
63% to 66%) on social security, welfare and income support. The main distinction, quite 
surprisingly, is that the United States spends 22% of social expenditures on education10, 
while Sweden spends only 8%. Another small, but significant distinction in expenditures 
is that Sweden spends 19% on other economic services (which includes labor training) 
while the breakdown of spending in the U.S. has no such category. By finding no 
significant difference in expenditure distribution between the United States and Sweden I 
demonstrate that the divergence in net social wage between the two countries is not due 
to a difference in the type or distribution of welfare spending. 
10 Although the share the U.S. spends on education is surprisingly high, this is beyond the 
scope of my study.  See Hanushek (2003) for a possible explanation. 
Contributions for social insurance 37% 
Federal income taxes 37% 
State & local income taxes 8% 
Other Taxes 0% 
Motor Vehicle and licenses 0% 
Personal Property Taxes 0% 
Indirect Taxes 18% Contributions for social insurance 37% 
Payroll Taxes 6% 
Federal income taxes 3% 
States & local income taxes 27% 
Other Taxes 0% 
Motor Vehicle and licenses 1% 
Personal Property Taxes 3% Indirect Taxes 23% 
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In terms of the tax distribution in 2000, both countries brought in 37% of taxes 
from contributions to social insurance, which formed the largest sources of taxes from 
workers in both countries (tied with federal income taxes in the U.S.). A very important 
distinction between the two country’s sources of taxes lies in the type of income taxes 
each country received. In the United States, the majority of income taxes derived from 
the federal level, accounting for 37% of total taxes and 85% of income taxes. While in 
Sweden the majority of income taxes derived from the state and local level, accounting 
for 27% of total taxes and 90% of all income taxes. What is interesting about this 
distinction is the fact that the United States is notorious for providing welfare on a local 
level with reluctance to ever nationalize programs unless it is absolutely necessary. The 
fact that 37% of the taxes workers pay goes to the federal government is likely a sign that 
these taxes are going to national projects that have little or no benefits for the workers.  
 
Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 My historical-institutional analysis of the welfare system in Sweden and the 
United States has yielded three important conclusions. First, since the rise of 
neoliberalism in the 1970s and 1980s, welfare systems throughout the world have been 
under attack. The driving force of this attack is the belief that welfare systems are a drag 
on the economy since they redistribute resources from productive to unproductive uses in 
the form of welfare expenditures. In order to test this hypothesis I use the net social wage 
methodology developed by Shaikh and Tonak (2000; 1987). Net social wage is calculated 
by subtracting the benefits received by workers from the taxes paid by them. A negative 
net social wage shows that a welfare system is self-financed by the workers and thus one 
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would argue, not a drag on the economy. My findings demonstrate that the net social 
wage has been negative in the U.S. from 1962 to the early 2000s and in Sweden from 
1965 to 2012. 
Second, workers in the United States comparatively pay a large portion of their 
taxes through federal income taxes than their Swedish counterparts. In fact, in Sweden, a 
country with a developed nationalized welfare system; workers pay only 3% of total 
taxes through federal income taxes, while the U.S., a country with a limited nationalized 
welfare system, receives 37% of total taxes from workers through federal income taxes 
(see figure 15 and figure 16). The fact that workers in the U.S. pay significantly more in 
federal income taxes than workers do in Sweden likely demonstrates that these taxes in 
the U.S. are going to expenditures other than just workers’ benefits such as military 
expenditure and other government spendings that have little or no benefits for the 
workers. This further demonstrates that in the U.S., workers are contributing to the 
country’s economy instead of being a burden on it. 
 The third conclusion is that over the years, Sweden’s net social wage has been 
secularly declining while the United States’ net social wage has shown much cyclicality. 
This is especially relevant if we look at how these two countries responded to the recent 
financial crises of the last decade. As the data shows, because of high taxes, expanding 
benefits during the time of crises did not cause an extensive strain on Sweden’s economy. 
However, in the U.S., with no universal safety net, the need to expand benefits during the 
times of crises was extremely urgent. As Fazeli and Fazeli (2012) argued, this shows that 
contrary to many mainstream economists’ claim that the welfare system was a 
contributing factor to the sluggish economic growth and the financial crisis, the positive 
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net social wage was in reality a consequence of the economic downturn and a weak 
welfare system.   
 My study has thus shown that the mainstream critique that welfare states are 
giving to the “undeserving” poor and/or are a drag on the economy does not have strong 
support. 
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Data Appendix 
 
Main Data Sources: 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), National Income Product Accounts (NIPA): 
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?ReqID=9&step=1#reqid=9&step=1&isuri=1 
 
Statistics Sweden Historical Yearbooks: http://www.scb.se/en_/Finding-
statistics/Historical-statistics/Statistical-Yearbook-of-Sweden/ 
 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD): http://www.oecd.org 
 
A1: Data Sources for the United States: 
Social Security and welfare BEA, NIPA table 3.12 lines 4-40 (minus 
lines 14, 16-20 and 26) 
Income support BEA, NIPA table 3.15.5, line 35 
Housing and community services BEA, NIPA table 3.15.5, line 26 
Employment and training BEA, NIPA table 3.12, line 41 
Education BEA, NIPA 3.15.5, line 29 
Health BEA, NIPA table 3.15.5, line 27 
Recreation and culture BEA, NIPA table 3.15.5, line 28 
Energy BEA, NIPA table 3.15.5, line 22 
Natural resources BEA, NIPA table 3.15.5, line 23 
Postal services BEA, NIPA table 3.15.5, line 24 
Transportation BEA, NIPA table 3.15.5, line 13 
Gas consumption of laborers Shaikh & Tonak, 2000 
Labor share BEA, NIPA table 2.1, line 1/2 
Contributions for social insurance 
BEA, NIPA table 3.6, lines 2-31 (minus 
lines 14, 16, 16 and 30) 
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Federal income taxes BEA, NIPA table 3.4, line 2 
State and local income taxes  BEA, NIPA table 3.4, line 9 
Other taxes BEA, NIPA table 3.4, line 12 
Motor vehicle and license taxes BEA, NIPA table 3.4, line 10 
Personal property taxes BEA, NIPA table 3.4, line 11 
Indirect taxes BEA, NIPA table 1.10, line 7 
 
A2: Data Sources for Sweden: 
Social Security, welfare and income 
support 
Statistics Sweden, State expenditure 
(current budget) by purpose table, 
"sociålvard och 
socialförsäkring"/"socialförsäkring och 
social välfärd"/"social trygghet" 
Housing and community services 
Statistics Sweden, State expenditure 
(current budget) by purpose table, 
"bostadspolitik och 
samhällsplanering"/"bostadspolitik 
samhällsplanering och lokaliseringpolitik" 
Employment and training 
Statistics Sweden, State expenditure 
(current budget) by purpose table, "andra 
samhälleliga och sociala tjänster" plus " 
"ekonomiska tjänster"/"näringslivsfrågor" 
Education 
Statistics Sweden, State expenditure 
(current budget) by purpose table, 
"undervisning"/"utbildning" 
Health 
Statistics Sweden, State expenditure 
(current budget) by purpose table, 
"hälsovård"/"hälso och sjukvård" 
Recreation and culture 
Statistics Sweden, State expenditure 
(current budget) by purpose table, "kultur 
rekreation" 
Energy 
Statistics Sweden, State expenditure 
(current budget) by purpose table, "energi" 
Environment 
Statistics Sweden, State expenditure 
(current budget) by purpose table, 
"Miljöskydd" 
Postal services 
Statistics Sweden, Post office: revenue and 
expenditure table, expenditure 
Railways 
Statistics Sweden, State railways: revenue, 
expenditure and financial results 
Labor share OECD, Labor Share 
Contributions for social insurance 
OECD, Tax Statistics Sweden, 2000 Social 
security contributions  
Payroll taxes 
OECD, Tax Statistics Sweden, 2000 Social 
security contributions  
Federal income taxes OECD, Tax Statistics Sweden, 1110 
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National income tax individual 
State and local income taxes  
OECD, Tax Statistics Sweden, 1110 Local 
income tax individual 
Other taxes OECD, Tax Statistics Sweden, 5113 Other 
Motor vehicle and license taxes 
OECD, Tax Statistics Sweden, 5211 Paid 
by households: motor vehicles  
Personal property taxes 
OECD, Tax Statistics Sweden, 4000 Taxes 
on property  
Indirect taxes 
OECD, Tax Statistics Sweden, 5100 Taxes 
on production, sale, transfer, etc.  
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A3:	  Net	  Social	  Wage	  for	  U.S.	  (Billions	  of	  U.S.	  Dollars)
Expenditures 1962 1963 1964
Expenditure Group I: Entirely Allocated to Labor (E1) 29.80 31.10 32.40
Social	  Security,	  welfare	  and	  income	  support 26.20 27.70 28.50
Housing	  and	  community	  services 3.60 3.40 3.90
Employment	  and	  training -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐
Expenditure Group II: Partially Allocated to Labor (E2*LS) 30.49 33.34 36.13
	  	  	  	  	  Labor	  Share 0.71 0.71 0.71
Expenditure Group II Total (E2) 42.97 46.78 50.66
Education 22.50 24.80 27.40
Health 5.50 5.90 6.40
Recreation	  and	  culture 1.20 1.30 1.30
Energy 1.80 1.80 2.10
Natural	  Resources 1.90 1.90 2.00
Postal	  Services 0.20 0.30 0.40
Passenger	  Transportation	  =	  transporation	  x	  GCONS 9.87 10.78 11.06
	  	  	  	  	  Transportation 14.10 15.40 15.80
	  	  	  	  	  Transportation	  (*gas	  consumption	  of	  laborers) 0.70 0.70 0.70
E1+E2*LS = Total benefits received by labor 60.29 64.44 68.53
Taxes 1962 1963 1964
Tax Group I: Paid Entirely by Labor (T1) 17.70 20.30 20.90
Contributions	  for	  social	  insurance 17.70 20.30 20.90
Tax Group II: Partially Allocated to Labor (T2*LS) 36.55 38.91 37.15
	  	  	  	  	  Labor	  Share	   0.71 0.71 0.71
Tax Group II Total (T2) 51.50 54.60 52.10
Total	  income	  taxes	  =	  federal	  +	  state	  and	  local	  income	  taxes 49.70 52.50 50.00
	  	  	  	  	  Federal	  income	  taxes 46.50 49.10 46.00
	  	  	  	  	  States	  &	  local	  income	  taxes 3.20 3.40 4.00
Other	  Taxes 0.20 0.30 0.30
Motor	  Vehicle	  and	  licenses 1.00 1.10 1.10
Personal	  Property	  Taxes 0.60 0.70 0.70
Tax Group III: Partially Allocated to Labor (T3*LS) 35.77 38.06 40.86
	  	  	  	  	  Labor	  Share 0.71 0.71 0.71
Tax Group III Total (T3) 50.40 53.40 57.30
Indirect	  Taxes 50.40 53.40 57.30
T1+T2*LS+T3*LS = Total taxes paid by labor 90.01 97.27 98.91
(E1+E2*LS) - (T1+T2*LS+T3*LS) = Net Social Wage -29.72 -32.83 -30.39
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
35.40 39.30 47.10 55.00 60.10 72.70 86.60
31.30 35.00 42.50 49.70 54.90 67.10 80.30
4.10 4.30 4.60 5.30 5.20 5.60 6.30
-­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐
39.38 45.27 50.24 55.65 61.70 68.76 75.54
0.71 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.72 0.72
55.33 62.39 69.26 76.42 84.26 95.10 105.56
30.60 35.40 39.50 43.60 48.40 54.60 61.00
6.60 7.30 8.30 9.60 10.80 12.60 14.30
1.40 1.50 1.70 2.00 2.30 2.60 2.90
2.10 2.00 2.60 3.00 3.50 3.90 4.20
2.40 2.70 3.00 2.80 3.00 3.60 4.00
0.40 0.40 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.40
11.83 13.09 13.86 15.12 15.96 17.50 18.76
16.90 18.70 19.80 21.60 22.80 25.00 26.80
0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70
74.78 84.57 97.34 110.65 121.80 141.46 162.14
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
21.80 29.60 32.30 36.30 41.50 43.70 48.50
21.80 29.60 32.30 36.30 41.50 43.70 48.50
41.07 48.18 52.88 63.28 76.59 74.54 72.78
0.71 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.72 0.72
57.70 66.40 72.90 86.90 104.60 103.10 101.70
55.50 64.00 70.50 84.20 101.50 99.80 98.20
51.10 58.60 64.40 76.40 91.70 88.90 85.80
4.40 5.40 6.10 7.80 9.80 10.90 12.40
0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.40 0.40 0.40
1.20 1.40 1.40 1.60 1.90 2.10 2.20
0.70 0.70 0.70 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.90
43.21 45.86 49.25 55.63 61.43 66.08 71.92
0.71 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.72 0.72
60.70 63.20 67.90 76.40 83.90 91.40 100.50
60.70 63.20 67.90 76.40 83.90 91.40 100.50
106.08 123.64 134.44 155.22 179.52 184.32 193.19
-31.29 -39.07 -37.10 -44.57 -57.73 -42.87 -31.05
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
96.10 110.50 131.90 163.90 180.50 193.90 209.30
89.70 103.30 123.20 153.60 169.50 183.00 195.50
6.40 7.20 8.50 9.70 10.10 10.00 11.90
-­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ 0.20 0.60 0.90 0.90 1.90
82.71 89.74 101.93 112.92 120.72 130.07 144.57
0.72 0.72 0.71 0.70 0.70 0.71 0.71
115.40 125.36 143.03 162.44 172.04 184.05 203.63
66.80 72.90 81.20 92.30 98.80 105.10 112.90
16.20 18.10 20.80 23.60 24.70 26.70 29.60
3.10 3.40 4.20 5.00 5.10 5.40 6.00
4.70 5.00 6.60 8.00 9.50 11.80 16.00
4.40 4.50 5.20 6.20 6.40 6.80 7.70
0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.80 0.60 0.70
19.60 20.86 24.43 26.74 26.74 27.65 30.73
28.00 29.80 34.90 38.20 38.20 39.50 43.90
0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70
178.81 200.24 233.83 276.82 301.22 323.97 353.87
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
56.00 71.90 81.20 85.20 96.80 108.30 126.00
56.00 71.90 81.20 85.20 96.80 108.30 126.00
88.65 94.85 107.68 102.60 120.90 139.64 162.87
0.72 0.72 0.71 0.70 0.70 0.71 0.71
123.70 132.50 151.10 147.60 172.30 197.60 229.40
120.00 128.50 146.90 143.20 167.50 192.60 223.90
102.80 109.60 126.50 120.70 141.20 162.20 188.90
17.20 18.90 20.40 22.50 26.30 30.40 35.00
0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.80 0.90
2.40 2.60 2.70 2.80 3.10 3.30 3.60
0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 1.00
77.33 83.90 89.01 94.05 102.73 112.86 121.33
0.72 0.72 0.71 0.70 0.70 0.71 0.71
107.90 117.20 124.90 135.30 146.40 159.70 170.90
107.90 117.20 124.90 135.30 146.40 159.70 170.90
221.98 250.65 277.89 281.86 320.43 360.80 410.20
-43.18 -50.41 -44.06 -5.04 -19.21 -36.83 -56.33
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
234.40 277.80 315.00 351.40 379.40 392.70 417.40
219.60 260.40 297.90 335.00 363.60 375.50 398.70
13.10 15.70 15.70 15.30 14.80 16.40 17.80
1.70 1.70 1.40 1.10 1.00 0.80 0.90
159.56 172.95 186.77 191.18 200.85 215.87 234.80
0.71 0.70 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68
223.87 246.40 270.06 280.45 296.18 319.44 345.56
124.20 135.20 145.50 154.90 163.90 178.10 194.10
31.60 36.30 38.90 40.30 42.60 46.40 49.80
6.60 7.10 7.50 8.00 8.30 8.90 9.90
16.60 17.60 23.80 20.60 20.70 20.60 21.30
9.10 10.20 11.50 11.90 13.10 13.40 14.50
0.70 0.80 1.00 1.00 1.10 1.50 1.50
35.07 39.20 41.86 43.75 46.48 50.54 54.46
50.10 56.00 59.80 62.50 66.40 72.20 77.80
0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70
393.96 450.75 501.77 542.58 580.25 608.57 652.20
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
146.80 159.50 188.50 200.80 217.40 247.60 269.00
146.80 159.50 188.50 200.80 217.40 247.60 269.00
191.37 209.80 238.74 241.46 238.91 255.04 283.62
0.71 0.70 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68
268.50 298.90 345.20 354.20 352.30 377.40 417.40
262.80 292.60 338.50 346.90 344.50 368.90 408.10
224.60 250.00 290.60 295.00 286.20 301.40 336.00
38.20 42.60 47.90 51.90 58.30 67.50 72.10
0.90 1.10 1.20 1.30 1.40 1.60 1.60
3.70 4.00 4.20 4.60 4.90 5.30 5.90
1.10 1.20 1.30 1.40 1.50 1.60 1.80
128.36 140.59 162.94 164.22 178.56 195.84 209.35
0.71 0.70 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68
180.10 200.30 235.60 240.90 263.30 289.80 308.10
180.10 200.30 235.60 240.90 263.30 289.80 308.10
466.53 509.90 590.18 606.48 634.87 698.47 761.97
-72.57 -59.14 -88.40 -63.90 -54.61 -89.91 -109.76
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
445.30 467.70 497.90 542.60 601.30 679.30 763.30
424.30 444.70 473.80 517.40 573.80 650.70 734.10
20.10 22.10 23.20 24.30 26.60 27.70 28.10
0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 1.10
250.84 269.03 288.31 307.05 333.87 353.50 371.57
0.68 0.69 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68
367.32 390.59 417.84 451.22 489.87 519.30 547.65
210.90 226.10 244.50 269.00 292.70 311.30 329.30
52.00 55.80 60.90 66.00 71.80 76.30 79.00
10.70 11.30 12.10 13.50 15.00 15.90 16.70
19.80 19.10 18.60 18.00 18.40 18.70 22.20
14.60 15.20 15.90 16.50 17.30 18.50 19.30
1.50 2.40 2.00 2.00 2.50 3.00 3.10
57.82 60.69 63.84 66.22 72.17 75.60 78.05
82.60 86.70 91.20 94.60 103.10 108.00 111.50
0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70
696.14 736.73 786.21 849.65 935.17 1032.80 1134.87
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
289.40 306.90 343.70 365.50 388.80 406.50 429.70
289.40 306.90 343.70 365.50 388.80 406.50 429.70
298.49 336.95 348.39 385.29 403.96 399.31 414.28
0.68 0.69 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68
437.10 489.20 504.90 566.20 592.70 586.60 610.60
427.40 478.50 493.40 553.80 579.70 573.00 595.60
350.00 392.50 402.80 451.50 470.10 461.30 475.20
77.40 86.00 90.60 102.30 109.60 111.70 120.40
1.40 1.60 1.70 1.80 1.90 2.00 2.10
6.30 6.80 7.30 7.80 8.10 8.40 9.20
2.00 2.30 2.50 2.80 3.00 3.20 3.70
220.84 239.35 258.41 271.44 289.66 311.16 327.98
0.68 0.69 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68
323.40 347.50 374.50 398.90 425.00 457.10 483.40
323.40 347.50 374.50 398.90 425.00 457.10 483.40
808.73 883.20 950.49 1022.23 1082.42 1116.97 1171.95
-112.60 -146.47 -164.28 -172.59 -147.25 -84.17 -37.09
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
810.30 849.30 898.20 941.60 973.10 997.20 1037.00
781.30 821.60 869.50 910.70 940.70 964.10 1001.70
27.90 26.60 27.60 30.00 31.40 32.00 34.20
1.10 1.10 1.10 0.90 1.00 1.10 1.10
385.23 404.45 422.42 436.12 461.05 487.61 532.17
0.68 0.68 0.67 0.66 0.67 0.67 0.68
569.35 598.56 630.87 657.01 691.87 728.63 785.31
343.30 362.40 387.90 408.40 434.10 460.30 495.30
81.00 84.20 86.00 87.70 89.20 93.30 101.10
17.10 18.10 19.40 20.70 22.40 23.70 25.00
24.00 22.40 24.00 21.10 20.90 19.60 22.40
19.20 21.60 21.90 23.20 23.30 24.70 25.90
2.50 2.50 2.70 3.30 3.90 4.20 4.80
82.25 87.36 88.97 92.61 98.07 102.83 110.81
117.50 124.80 127.10 132.30 140.10 146.90 158.30
0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70
1195.53 1253.75 1320.62 1377.72 1434.15 1484.81 1569.17
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
451.40 481.30 504.40 525.70 556.60 592.50 627.30
451.40 481.30 504.40 525.70 556.60 592.50 627.30
437.43 466.57 498.10 552.21 617.21 686.88 750.44
0.68 0.68 0.67 0.66 0.67 0.67 0.68
646.50 690.50 743.90 831.90 926.20 1026.40 1107.40
631.70 674.70 727.50 815.60 908.90 1008.20 1088.50
505.50 542.50 585.80 663.30 744.20 825.20 893.00
126.20 132.20 141.70 152.30 164.70 183.00 195.50
2.30 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.80 3.00 3.00
8.90 9.20 9.70 9.30 9.90 10.40 10.80
3.60 4.10 4.20 4.50 4.60 4.80 5.10
340.40 368.39 373.56 385.53 407.56 427.96 456.47
0.68 0.68 0.67 0.66 0.67 0.67 0.68
503.10 545.20 557.90 580.80 611.60 639.50 673.60
503.10 545.20 557.90 580.80 611.60 639.50 673.60
1229.23 1316.27 1376.06 1463.44 1581.37 1707.34 1834.21
-33.70 -62.52 -55.44 -85.72 -147.22 -222.53 -265.04
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1091.90 1197.90 1309.80 1380.10 1456.00 1550.30 1666.50
1057.80 1158.60 1266.30 1334.70 1408.90 1499.90 1607.90
33.10 37.90 41.90 44.00 45.80 49.20 57.30
1.00 1.40 1.60 1.40 1.30 1.20 1.30
576.01 609.92 643.40 673.19 707.67 742.96 774.96
0.68 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.66
849.06 906.55 958.46 1003.38 1055.04 1112.20 1176.39
536.00 574.10 593.20 617.00 652.70 686.10 728.00
109.70 116.00 130.10 142.20 150.00 162.20 167.20
28.10 30.60 33.00 32.90 34.40 36.60 37.90
22.10 22.30 26.50 30.60 30.40 28.80 31.40
29.10 30.50 35.10 34.30 36.60 38.70 41.50
4.50 3.90 2.80 2.60 3.10 3.70 4.00
119.56 129.15 137.76 143.78 147.84 156.10 166.39
170.80 184.50 196.80 205.40 211.20 223.00 237.70
0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70
1667.91 1807.82 1953.20 2053.29 2163.67 2293.26 2441.46
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
669.80 695.50 712.40 737.70 784.90 825.60 871.10
669.80 695.50 712.40 737.70 784.90 825.60 871.10
836.01 830.77 705.05 671.59 701.54 807.29 890.72
0.68 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.66
1232.30 1234.80 1050.30 1001.00 1045.90 1208.50 1352.10
1213.00 1215.10 1029.80 978.80 1022.10 1183.60 1325.80
995.60 991.80 828.50 774.10 798.50 932.10 1049.60
217.40 223.30 201.30 204.70 223.60 251.50 276.20
3.10 3.30 3.40 3.70 4.40 4.70 5.00
11.40 11.30 11.90 12.70 13.70 14.00 14.70
4.80 5.10 5.20 5.80 5.70 6.20 6.60
480.72 489.59 511.92 542.10 579.46 624.26 653.43
0.68 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.66
708.60 727.70 762.60 808.00 863.90 934.50 991.90
708.60 727.70 762.60 808.00 863.90 934.50 991.90
1986.53 2015.87 1929.37 1951.39 2065.90 2257.15 2415.24
-318.62 -208.04 23.83 101.90 97.77 36.11 26.22
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
1762.70 1880.50 2123.60 2254.90 2281.00 2329.70
1702.20 1817.90 2061.70 2189.60 2221.30 2273.20
59.50 61.50 60.50 63.80 58.50 55.40
1.00 1.10 1.40 1.50 1.20 1.10
832.94 871.06 881.54 890.69 868.00 878.46
0.66 0.65 0.64 0.64 0.63 0.63
1264.92 1340.21 1367.64 1390.17 1383.11 1401.99
776.10 816.80 828.40 830.90 822.50 822.10
183.70 201.70 209.50 218.40 226.10 237.30
40.90 43.20 43.30 42.90 41.80 41.60
36.40 39.20 41.40 46.70 39.30 41.00
47.00 46.60 47.70 50.80 51.00 51.20
4.00 3.50 3.30 3.00 2.70 2.50
176.82 189.21 194.04 197.47 199.71 206.29
252.60 270.30 277.20 282.10 285.30 294.70
0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70
2595.64 2751.56 3005.14 3145.59 3149.00 3208.16
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
907.50 933.40 909.60 929.70 866.60 900.00
907.50 933.40 909.60 929.70 866.60 900.00
979.77 932.80 737.97 763.27 881.11 938.68
0.66 0.65 0.64 0.64 0.63 0.63
1487.90 1435.20 1144.90 1191.30 1404.00 1498.10
1460.80 1408.70 1116.70 1160.90 1373.10 1466.50
1164.40 1101.70 857.20 893.80 1077.00 1149.20
296.40 307.00 259.50 267.10 296.10 317.30
5.20 4.60 5.40 6.60 6.70 6.90
15.00 14.90 15.40 16.30 16.90 17.40
6.90 7.00 7.40 7.50 7.30 7.30
681.28 677.18 661.40 677.29 688.51 703.59
0.66 0.65 0.64 0.64 0.63 0.63
1034.60 1041.90 1026.10 1057.10 1097.10 1122.90
1034.60 1041.90 1026.10 1057.10 1097.10 1122.90
2568.55 2543.38 2308.97 2370.26 2436.22 2542.27
27.09 208.18 696.18 775.33 712.78 665.89
A4:	  Net	  Social	  Wage	  for	  Sweden	  (Billions	  of	  Swedish	  Kronor)
Expenditures 1965 1966
Expenditure Group I: Entirely Allocated to Labor (E1) 11.82 13.38
Social	  Security,	  welfare	  and	  income	  support 7.87 8.67
Housing	  and	  community	  services 0.79 1.05
Other	  economic	  services 3.15 3.66
Expenditure Group II: Partially Allocated to Labor (E2*LS) 5.16 6.27
	  	  	  	  	  Labor	  Share 0.72 0.72
Expenditure Group II Total (E2) 7.17 8.751
Education 4.58 5.41
Health 1.12 1.69
Recreation	  and	  culture -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐
Energy -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐
Environment -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐
Postal	  Services 1.47 1.65
Railways -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐
E1+E2*LS = Total benefits received by labor 16.98 19.65
Taxes 1965 1966
Tax Group I: Paid Entirely by Labor (T1) 4.86 5.59
Contributions	  for	  social	  insurance 4.85 5.58
Payroll	  Taxes 0.01 0.02
Tax Group II: Partially Allocated to Labor (T2*LS) 13.86 15.14
	  	  	  	  	  Labor	  Share 0.72 0.72
Tax Group II Total (T2) 19.35 21.13
Total	  income	  taxes	  =	  federal	  +	  state	  and	  local	  income	  taxes 17.97 19.71
	  	  	  	  	  Federal	  income	  taxes 8.68 8.68
	  	  	  	  	  States	  &	  local	  income	  taxes 9.29 11.03
Other	  Taxes 0.00 0.00
Motor	  Vehicle	  and	  licenses 0.66 0.71
Personal	  Property	  Taxes 0.71 0.71
Tax Group III Labor Total: Partially Allocated to Labor = T3*LS 8.46 9.90
	  	  	  	  	  Labor	  Share 0.72 0.72
Tax Group III Total (T3) 11.81 13.81
Indirect	  Taxes 11.81 13.81
T1+T2*LS+T3*LS = Total taxes paid by labor 27.19 30.64
(E1+E2*LS) - (T1+T2*LS+T3*LS) = Net Social Wage -10.21 -10.98
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
14.29 15.05 16.08 17.98 21.89 24.22 30.02
9.59 10.66 11.65 13.36 16.82 18.43 22.86
0.92 0.69 0.40 0.48 0.87 0.96 1.14
3.78 3.69 4.02 4.14 4.20 4.83 6.02
6.93 7.38 8.27 8.89 9.81 10.79 11.08
0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.73 0.70
9.669 10.304 11.545 12.403 13.694 14.805 15.824
6.15 6.58 7.38 7.89 9.00 9.35 10.12
1.71 1.73 1.84 2.00 2.01 2.61 2.37
-­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐
-­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐
-­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐
1.82 1.99 2.32 2.51 2.68 2.85 3.34
2.34 2.42 2.51 2.66 2.72 -­‐-­‐-­‐ 3.11
21.22 22.43 24.35 26.87 31.70 35.00 41.11
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
6.99 8.61 10.14 11.12 13.60 15.86 19.01
6.98 8.59 9.52 10.36 11.87 13.77 14.83
0.02 0.02 0.62 0.77 1.73 2.10 4.18
16.75 18.44 20.74 24.32 25.26 29.48 29.68
0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.73 0.70
23.37 25.74 28.95 33.93 35.25 40.46 42.37
21.82 23.87 26.94 31.70 32.86 37.95 39.60
9.59 10.44 11.69 13.86 13.39 15.25 14.67
12.23 13.43 15.25 17.84 19.47 22.69 24.93
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.14 0.15 0.16
0.75 0.97 1.04 1.18 1.25 1.28 1.44
0.80 0.87 0.93 1.01 1.00 1.09 1.17
10.69 11.59 12.46 13.18 16.38 17.83 18.45
0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.73 0.70
14.91 16.17 17.38 18.39 22.85 24.47 26.34
14.91 16.17 17.38 18.39 22.85 24.47 26.34
34.43 38.64 43.34 48.62 55.24 63.17 67.14
-13.21 -16.21 -18.99 -21.75 -23.53 -28.17 -26.03
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
35.12 43.52 53.13 63.27 75.42 82.53 75.97
25.61 29.05 34.84 42.64 47.86 53.97 59.73
1.16 3.18 3.68 4.41 5.80 5.92 15.25
8.36 11.29 14.61 16.23 21.76 22.63 0.99
11.59 14.18 17.27 20.41 24.48 25.58 29.54
0.69 0.71 0.74 0.77 0.78 0.76 0.74
16.889 20.076 23.289 26.464 31.402 33.583 39.977
11.28 13.26 15.54 17.62 21.61 23.13 28.30
2.76 3.38 3.44 4.07 4.55 4.52 4.85
-­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ 1.59
-­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐
-­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐
2.85 3.44 4.31 4.77 5.24 5.93 6.83
3.54 4.06 4.66 5.22 5.50 5.95 6.68
46.71 57.70 70.39 83.68 99.90 108.11 105.52
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
26.15 31.48 46.09 57.57 63.57 68.04 81.41
21.30 25.76 38.23 47.61 56.48 62.55 74.65
4.85 5.72 7.86 9.95 7.10 5.49 6.76
36.99 46.77 56.49 64.57 75.27 81.49 86.04
0.69 0.71 0.74 0.77 0.78 0.76 0.74
53.91 66.20 76.20 83.71 96.57 106.99 116.42
50.37 62.28 71.93 78.68 91.41 101.19 109.82
19.59 27.01 29.20 29.21 32.29 34.86 31.68
30.78 35.27 42.73 49.47 59.12 66.33 78.13
0.24 0.26 0.31 0.31 0.26 0.36 0.42
2.19 2.20 2.24 3.04 3.14 3.36 3.76
1.11 1.47 1.72 1.68 1.75 2.09 2.42
18.40 21.15 27.36 31.69 35.82 38.80 43.21
0.69 0.71 0.74 0.77 0.78 0.76 0.74
26.82 29.94 36.91 41.08 45.96 50.94 58.47
26.82 29.94 36.91 41.08 45.96 50.94 58.47
81.55 99.40 129.94 153.82 174.66 188.33 210.66
-34.84 -41.69 -59.55 -70.14 -74.77 -80.23 -105.14
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
83.76 97.63 106.42 118.80 112.40 124.34 130.11
65.05 63.13 68.38 75.75 79.37 86.99 94.66
17.53 18.07 20.05 23.77 13.86 17.34 16.72
1.18 16.43 17.98 19.27 19.17 20.02 18.73
28.68 32.85 33.34 34.77 35.68 38.01 40.36
0.74 0.72 0.70 0.68 0.69 0.69 0.70
38.597 45.741 47.918 51.047 51.857 54.963 57.929
31.41 33.14 35.64 37.67 40.01 42.02 44.92
5.45 4.99 4.76 4.57 4.58 4.92 4.99
1.74 2.44 2.63 2.78 2.97 3.13 3.15
-­‐-­‐-­‐ 5.17 4.88 6.03 4.30 4.90 4.87
-­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐
-­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐
-­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐
112.44 130.47 139.76 153.56 148.08 162.35 170.47
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
93.37 94.14 109.80 120.74 124.31 144.22 158.48
85.84 86.63 95.66 103.78 108.21 124.46 137.28
7.53 7.51 14.14 16.96 16.11 19.76 21.20
95.67 97.94 104.79 112.13 127.87 145.77 174.78
0.74 0.72 0.70 0.68 0.69 0.69 0.70
128.75 136.38 150.60 164.64 185.85 210.79 250.86
121.87 128.81 140.04 153.33 170.41 190.23 211.79
33.59 34.84 35.35 37.24 41.01 48.92 58.80
88.27 93.97 104.69 116.09 129.40 141.32 152.99
0.44 0.50 0.51 0.64 0.62 0.75 0.98
3.86 3.90 4.14 4.22 4.66 5.89 5.33
2.58 3.17 5.91 6.45 10.16 13.92 32.76
49.06 51.76 58.29 64.95 76.14 81.92 93.08
0.74 0.72 0.70 0.68 0.69 0.69 0.70
66.02 72.08 83.78 95.37 110.66 118.46 133.59
66.02 72.08 83.78 95.37 110.66 118.46 133.59
238.10 243.84 272.88 297.82 328.32 371.91 426.34
-125.66 -113.37 -133.12 -144.26 -180.24 -209.56 -255.87
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
139.12 154.88 175.60 210.11 268.82 243.96 230.16
101.95 110.94 125.16 131.07 139.21 138.84 145.97
18.69 24.85 27.76 37.02 43.68 40.03 37.98
18.48 19.09 22.69 42.01 85.93 65.08 46.21
37.67 41.24 50.85 52.50 45.94 31.42 32.25
0.70 0.71 0.73 0.73 0.72 0.70 0.68
54.047 58.112 69.714 71.767 64.081 45.137 47.221
44.70 48.38 59.41 61.74 54.62 37.04 39.69
4.99 5.09 5.22 4.97 3.34 1.88 1.45
3.35 3.92 4.46 4.42 5.12 5.22 5.46
1.00 0.73 0.64 0.63 1.00 0.99 0.62
-­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐
-­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐
-­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐
176.79 196.12 226.45 262.60 314.76 275.38 262.42
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
169.86 199.18 224.55 252.71 237.65 207.21 221.54
153.80 182.25 205.87 225.80 216.12 197.82 211.39
16.06 16.93 18.69 26.91 21.53 9.39 10.15
185.00 212.37 237.66 218.94 207.58 203.25 213.69
0.70 0.71 0.73 0.73 0.72 0.70 0.68
265.43 299.25 325.84 299.30 289.53 292.00 312.86
238.67 268.82 290.83 259.82 255.90 261.42 283.04
69.67 77.58 70.76 20.54 10.69 11.73 21.13
169.00 191.25 220.07 239.28 245.22 249.69 261.91
1.71 1.49 1.26 0.40 0.45 0.44 0.73
6.00 6.04 7.12 7.77 6.84 6.89 4.14
19.05 22.90 26.63 31.32 26.34 23.25 24.95
99.84 113.04 132.45 144.34 131.78 132.55 134.22
0.70 0.71 0.73 0.73 0.72 0.70 0.68
143.25 159.28 181.59 197.31 183.81 190.43 196.51
143.25 159.28 181.59 197.31 183.81 190.43 196.51
454.70 524.58 594.66 615.99 577.00 543.02 569.45
-277.91 -328.46 -368.21 -353.39 -262.24 -267.64 -307.03
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
270.35 298.79 278.83 260.48 281.39 315.85 328.21
189.85 222.59 209.36 200.64 229.05 239.80 258.86
36.80 32.35 25.79 17.86 13.50 7.54 6.18
43.70 43.84 43.67 41.98 38.84 68.51 63.18
30.85 31.91 34.96 50.12 49.16 47.96 51.60
0.65 0.68 0.67 0.67 0.65 0.67 0.69
47.154 47.245 52.279 75.129 75.275 71.199 74.49
38.85 38.61 43.92 52.89 52.15 44.83 47.34
2.20 2.32 2.25 15.60 16.08 18.79 18.46
4.95 5.32 5.45 5.61 5.77 5.41 5.57
1.16 1.00 0.66 1.04 1.29 -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐
-­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ 2.17 3.12
-­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐
-­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐
301.20 330.70 313.79 310.60 330.56 363.81 379.82
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
255.35 283.36 303.77 329.40 339.88 357.24 381.79
237.55 261.93 273.46 282.43 261.24 307.10 330.62
17.80 21.43 30.30 46.97 78.64 50.15 51.17
204.58 233.02 246.37 257.16 275.34 281.28 303.40
0.65 0.68 0.67 0.67 0.65 0.67 0.69
312.67 344.99 368.39 385.51 421.59 417.59 437.96
283.87 305.33 324.19 341.31 375.62 368.79 391.65
18.80 28.24 38.69 42.43 52.46 32.49 32.26
265.07 277.09 285.50 298.88 323.15 336.30 359.39
1.44 0.99 0.97 1.30 0.98 1.48 1.91
4.10 5.47 6.24 6.10 6.42 7.43 7.66
23.26 33.20 36.98 36.80 38.57 39.89 36.74
155.52 158.14 163.04 166.83 170.82 188.23 199.84
0.65 0.68 0.67 0.67 0.65 0.67 0.69
237.69 234.13 243.79 250.09 261.55 279.45 288.47
237.69 234.13 243.79 250.09 261.55 279.45 288.47
615.46 674.52 713.17 753.39 786.05 826.76 885.02
-314.25 -343.82 -399.38 -442.79 -455.49 -462.95 -505.21
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
340.65 373.07 384.62 396.68 404.91 393.82 427.72
273.27 309.87 315.34 318.72 321.73 304.35 296.64
5.22 5.48 5.46 5.60 5.30 4.46 3.71
62.16 57.72 63.82 72.36 77.88 85.02 127.37
55.18 52.91 57.39 57.80 59.45 56.99 58.41
0.69 0.68 0.67 0.67 0.65 0.66 0.65
80.378 78.107 85.958 86.664 91.617 86.711 89.22
52.11 48.97 51.78 50.38 53.13 47.03 48.24
19.29 20.23 24.54 24.54 25.87 28.33 29.45
5.82 6.09 6.38 6.56 6.84 6.95 7.07
-­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐
3.16 2.83 3.26 5.19 5.78 4.40 4.46
-­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐
-­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐
395.83 425.97 442.01 454.48 464.36 450.81 486.13
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
392.12 401.53 411.22 424.74 442.35 469.54 494.50
336.72 341.42 350.15 361.72 362.78 385.66 369.89
55.40 60.11 61.08 63.02 79.56 83.88 124.61
313.31 325.99 336.37 350.32 356.69 377.56 394.60
0.69 0.68 0.67 0.67 0.65 0.66 0.65
456.42 481.26 503.78 525.26 549.64 574.47 602.78
409.24 433.33 452.98 472.78 494.65 523.39 550.52
30.74 30.25 33.14 37.20 40.54 44.32 47.10
378.49 403.08 419.84 435.58 454.12 479.07 503.42
1.65 1.01 1.34 1.35 1.21 1.77 1.61
8.17 8.33 8.78 11.02 11.78 13.08 16.03
37.36 38.59 40.69 40.12 41.99 36.23 34.62
207.97 213.82 217.52 228.33 233.37 250.40 259.64
0.69 0.68 0.67 0.67 0.65 0.66 0.65
302.97 315.65 325.79 342.35 359.61 380.99 396.61
302.97 315.65 325.79 342.35 359.61 380.99 396.61
913.40 941.34 965.11 1003.39 1032.40 1097.51 1148.74
-517.57 -515.37 -523.10 -548.91 -568.04 -646.70 -662.61
2009 2010 2011 2012
397.73 400.69 388.52 401.84
306.26 303.67 297.20 304.92
4.42 4.22 3.59 3.50
87.05 92.80 87.73 93.42
66.06 67.52 66.16 67.26
0.67 0.65 0.64 0.65
98.158 103.757 103.234 103.35
53.87 57.20 56.41 54.22
32.37 33.85 33.53 35.60
7.37 8.39 8.90 9.23
-­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐
4.54 4.32 4.39 4.31
-­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐-­‐
463.79 468.21 454.68 469.10
2009 2010 2011 2012
476.20 486.54 509.45 527.71
353.61 379.03 354.11 367.68
122.59 107.51 155.34 160.03
406.32 403.34 408.16 431.63
0.67 0.65 0.64 0.65
603.74 619.77 636.85 663.19
551.09 565.45 582.86 608.40
39.94 42.60 44.64 46.00
511.15 522.85 538.23 562.41
1.99 1.42 1.75 1.80
16.38 16.40 15.72 15.60
34.29 36.51 36.51 37.38
270.58 279.71 279.84 285.78
0.67 0.65 0.64 0.65
402.04 429.80 436.64 439.10
402.04 429.80 436.64 439.10
1153.10 1169.59 1197.45 1245.12
-689.31 -701.38 -742.77 -776.01
